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ABSTRACT 
We study optimal disclosure of variety by a multi-product firm with random costs. In our model there are 
two varieties that are horizontally differentiated and differ in overall quality, but buyers cannot 
distinguish between them without labels. The equilibrium prices for labeled varieties are increasing 
functions of the absolute value of the cost differential and do not reveal which variety is cheaper to 
produce. Nondisclosure is most common when there is moderate uncertainty about the relative input cost, 
not too much idiosyncrasy in consumer valuations, and not too much difference in quality across 
varieties. Although mandatory disclosure of variety benefits consumers, it decreases expected welfare 
when relative input cost variability is large and quality asymmetry is small. The cheaper variety tends to 
be oversupplied (undersupplied) when disclosure is voluntary (mandatory). Competition among multi-
product firms that source inputs in the same upstream market may not lead to more disclosure.” 
Keywords:  information, labeling, quality disclosure, product differentiation vi 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Until recently voluntary country-of-origin labeling of food products was relatively uncommon in the 
United States even though the aggregate import share grew to 7percent of value and 15percent of volume 
of domestic food consumption in 2005 (Jerardo 2008).
1  In 2009, the mandatory country of origin labeling 
(MCOOL) regulation contained in the 2002 and 2008 Farm Security and Rural Investment Acts took 
effect (Federal Register 2009). This labeling regulation requires food retailers to notify their customers of 
the country of origin of various muscle cuts and ground meats, fish, perishable agricultural commodities 
(fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables), and nuts. In this paper, we study a model that captures some 
features of the food and agricultural markets covered by MCOOL, and evaluate the welfare economics of 
mandatory labeling that provides a cue to consumers about their willingness to pay for a product. 
Most of the previous studies of product origin labeling consider producers who cannot credibly 
signal the quality of their products and use geographical indications (GIs) as a means of costly credible 
certification (for example, Zago and Pick 2004, Lence et al. 2007, Langinier and Babcock 2008, 
Moschini, Menapace, and Pick 2008).
2  In such cases labeling regulation (GIs) allows suppliers to 
transmit information about product attributes to consumers, which they could not do prior to regulation. 
However, as discussed in Krissoff et al (2004), there is little evidence that consumers systemically lacked 
trust in the country-of-origin information provided by the US food marketing system.
3  When credible 
voluntary product origin labeling is possible, analyzing the effects of MCOOL requires assessing its 
scope. That is, we need to allow the provision of information about product origin to be endogenously 
determined, identify conditions under which product origin is not revealed in equilibrium, and compare 
equilibria with and without labeling (Carter, Krissoff, and Zwane 2006). Such an economic analysis 
involves several modeling decisions that need justification.  
First, we abstract from the vertical relations in the industry and consider a retailer (downstream 
seller) that sources a good from two countries, and can at no cost ascertain products’ country of origin and 
choose whether to label or not label products with their country of origin.
4  Although direct labeling costs 
can be considerable, unlike GIs, country of origin labeling (by itself) typically does not entail significant 
changes in production practices other than collecting information and keeping records about product 
movement (Federal Register 2009).  
Second, we assume that products from different countries are differentiated in terms of quality 
(for example, safety) and a non-quality characteristic like flavor. In particular, we consider a version of 
the Hotelling model with consumers that are located along the unit interval, interpreted to be the most 
preferred product characteristic. A good from one country is located at point 0, and a good from the other 
country is located at point 1. Each country’s product is also defined along a second dimension, interpreted 
to be product quality. We assume that consumers cannot identify the country of origin without labeling, 
that is, without labels consumers do not know whether a product is variety 0 or 1. As discussed in Lusk et 
al. (2006), consumers may value similar products from different countries differently because of concerns 
with overall quality and safety as well idiosyncratic preferences. Although the food imported into the 
                                                       
1 An example of voluntary labeling of food products with their country of origin are lamb imports from Australia and New 
Zealand (Marette, Clemens and Babcock 2008). Also, there are many examples of the use of geographical origin within the 
United States as a basis for branding commodities such as Main lobster, Kona coffee, Idaho potatoes, Napa Valley wine, Vidalia 
onions, Washington State apples, Texas Ruby Red grapefruits, and Florida orange juice (Hayes, Lence, and Babcock 2005). 
2 Geographical indications (GIs) such as Protected Designation of Origin or Protected Geographical Indication have long 
been used by agricultural producers in the European Union. GIs not only indicate origin of the food product but also convey a 
certain quality and product specification (European Commission 2007). 
3 For example, there were no retailers who participated in the voluntary labeling programs for beef and other products that 
were offered by USDA before the mandatory policy went into effect (Federal Register 2009, p. 2682).  
4 So even if products are labeled with their country of origin at a wholesale level, the downstream seller can withhold this 
information from customers by relabeling final products with an uninformative label. For example, Kay (2008) remarked that 
even with MCOOL suppliers are able to market a differentiated product as generic by listing several countries on the label. In 
Section 5, we demonstrate that unlabeled products can be offered in equilibrium with competition among spatially differentiated 
retailers. 2 
United States is subjected to the same safety standards as domestically grown food, production methods 
may still vary across exporting countries (Krissoff et al 2004). Such variability tends to result in unique 
flavor or nutritional content (and other experience or credence attributes) of food products from different 
countries (Umberger et al. 2002, Sitz et al. 2005, Feuz et al. 2007).  
Third, we assume that the production costs (or wholesale prices) for products from different 
countries are subject to country-specific random shocks that are not observable to consumers. Most of the 
commodities covered by the mandatory labeling policy (muscle cuts and ground meats, and fruits and 
vegetables) are characterized by relatively short shelf-life and seasonal variations in supply. When 
domestic supply is low or unavailable, and storage is costly, off-season demand is met by imports, and the 
imported and domestic varieties are typically marketed during different (possibly overlapping) time 
periods (Huang and Huang 2007).
5  
Note that in the context of labeling what is unknown to consumers is the content (country of 
origin) of a particular unit of a product. So we assume that consumers know their willingness to pay for 
variety 0 and variety 1 (which is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components), but cannot distinguish 
between them without labels. Although throughout our analysis we assume that the overall quality of each 
variety is fixed, the differences in quality across varieties can be interpreted as publicly known shocks to 
quality. Quality shocks such as food contamination and disease outbreaks tend to be (perhaps with a lag) 
widely reported in the media, while country-specific input prices and product availability tend to receive 
less public attention.  
When production costs are constant, as shown by Wolinsky (1987), a menu of labeled varieties 
and an unlabeled (unidentified) variety allows the seller to more effectively sort consumers according to 
their willingness to pay. Buyers who strongly prefer one of the varieties choose the appropriate labeled 
variety, and indifferent buyers choose a cheaper unlabeled variety. In this paper we analyze an extension 
of Wolinsky’s (1987) model and consider what happens when production costs are subject to variety-
specific shocks that are not observable to buyers, and the seller is free to change the variety of the 
unlabeled product when the relative costs change. In order to avoid “indirect” disclosure of the identity of 
the least-cost variety to buyers, the seller’s pricing strategy must be such that it does not reveal her cost 
structure. To our knowledge this is the first paper to study labeling of products with variety by a multi-
product firm in a framework with “universal private information” where consumers privately observe 
their preferences and the firm privately observes its production costs.
6 
In Section 3, we characterize equilibrium when quality is symmetric and high relative to the 
variability in idiosyncratic consumer valuations and production costs. In equilibrium the seller raises 
prices for both labeled varieties when the ex post cost differential increases. As a result the unlabeled 
product that consists of the cheaper variety is purchased by more consumers who remain in the dark about 
its true identity. For intermediate levels of ex ante cost variability the seller typically serves many or all 
consumers with an unlabeled variety, and nondisclosure is most common. On the one hand, for small cost 
variability there is more disclosure, because the seller targets consumers who strongly prefer a particular 
variety with relatively cheap labeled varieties. On the other hand, there is also more disclosure when ex 
ante cost variability is large, because the seller has no reason to hide the identity of the ex post least-cost 
variety when it is very expensive.    
We also consider equilibrium with asymmetric quality across varieties. For small quality 
asymmetry and cost variability, equilibrium is similar to the case of symmetric quality. However, for 
large quality asymmetry prices tend to be more informative about relative costs, and the characterization 
                                                       
5 For example, Kay (2008) reported that “…any additional segregation of livestock and finished product will translate into 
higher wholesale prices and reduced product availability, Tyson warns” (italics added). Also, surveys of Belgium consumers 
found that origin-labeled meat products were perceived as less convenient to purchase due to reduced availability (Verbeke and 
Roosen 2009). 
6 Daughety and Reinganum (2007) introduce this term to describe an environment in which firms privately observe the 
quality of their product and consumers privately observe their preferences. They assume that firms make disclosure decisions 
before they learn their quality. Here we consider a firm that makes disclosure decisions after it observes its production costs for 
varieties that may differ in overall quality.  3 
of equilibrium depends on the distribution of cost shocks. We completely characterize equilibrium for 
different levels of quality asymmetry in a special case with negatively dependent binary cost shocks. 
When quality asymmetry is sufficiently great and cost variability is not too great, disclosure is “quality-
biased” whereas the seller always offers the labeled high-quality variety and an unlabeled product that can 
consist of either variety. However, if quality asymmetry is not too great and cost variability is sufficiently 
great, variety is never disclosed in equilibrium.  
In Section 4, we analyze the effects of mandatory disclosure on welfare. We find that although it 
benefits consumers, the overall welfare may increase or decrease. This is because the seller tends to 
oversupply the cheaper variety under voluntary disclosure but undersupply it under mandatory disclosure. 
Suppose that quality is symmetric and high, so that the market is covered (each consumer participates in 
the market) before and after the policy. Then mandatory disclosure will increase ex post social welfare for 
small cost differentials but decrease it for large cost differentials. When costs are similar across varieties 
most consumers should get their preferred variety, and this is what happens under mandatory disclosure. 
When costs are very different across varieties, most consumers should be served with the cheaper variety, 
and this is what happens in equilibrium with no disclosure. For moderate differences in costs there are 
distortions before and after the policy: The seller serves too many consumers with the cheaper variety 
under voluntary disclosure and too few under voluntary disclosure.  
And so, mandatory disclosure increases expected social welfare (that is, before costs are known to 
an independent observer) for small cost variability, but decreases it for large cost variability. Mandatory 
disclosure is also tends to decrease expected welfare when costs are negatively correlated as large cost 
differentials become more likely. It is worth pointing out that under “large” cost variability production 
costs may exceed the choke-off demand price. In the context of country of origin labeling, “large” 
country-specific cost variability can be caused by seasonality in agricultural production whereby product 
availability fluctuates during the year and varies across exporting countries. However, even with large and 
negatively correlated cost shocks, mandatory disclosure may increase expected welfare if quality 
asymmetry is large. This happens when welfare gains from avoiding overconsumption of the cheap low-
quality variety, on average, offset welfare losses from underconsumption of the cheap high-quality variety 
as a result of the policy. 
In Section 5, we investigate whether competition among multi-product firms generates more 
disclosure of variety in equilibrium. We consider spatially differentiated firms that source varieties in the 
same upstream market, and demonstrate that independent firms may also practice nondisclosure. Suppose 
that only one of the varieties is available in the upstream market, but consumers do not know which one. 
Then in a non-cooperative equilibrium a firm that expects that the other firm will not disclose its variety, 
will not achieve higher profits from its own disclosure. On the one hand, if firms are located close to each 
other and price competition is fierce, the disclosing firm will not be able to raise its price without losing 
many customers. This is because consumers, who now know which variety is available, will be attracted 
by the low price at the non-disclosing firm even if it continues to market unlabeled products. On the other 
hand, if the firms are far apart and price competition is not fierce, the disclosing firm (as well as the non-
disclosing firm) will earn a lower profit due to a reduction in sales to consumers who find out that the 
available variety is not a good match for them.     
Our results suggest that, even without accounting for the direct costs of implementing MCOOL, it 
may decrease social welfare. In particular, this may happen when most consumers view products from 
different countries as close substitutes, and wholesale prices in different countries are volatile and 
uncorrelated. The model demonstrates that the characteristics of exporting countries such as history of 
food safety lapses (vertical quality), production methods (horizontal attributes), and growing seasons 
(product availability and cost volatility) can play a rather nuanced role in both the scope and the effects of 
MCOOL on welfare. To the extent that geographic distance between areas where products originate may 
increase the heterogeneity in consumer preferences and weaken the correlation between wholesale prices, 
the model predicts a positive relationship between the prevalence of voluntary country of origin labeling 
and the distances to and among exporting countries during the pre-MCOOL period. Our modeling 
approach complements the current studies of the effects of MCOOL on welfare that take into account the 4 
additional direct costs created by the policy (Jones, Somwaru, and Whitaker 2009), and suggests that a 
more complete assessment should include the information effects of the policy on the demand and supply 
side of the market. 
Our findings can also be used to shed light on other issues in the economics of food labeling 
(Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell 2000). For example, consumers had little knowledge that relatively cheap 
soybean oil and corn sweeteners had been replacing saturated fats and sugar in many packaged foods 
during the 1970s and 1980s (Golan and Unnevehr 2008). The reversion of these trends started with the 
US Food and Drug Administration regulation requiring disclosure of trans fat content on nutrition labels 
and increased media attention (Unnevehr and Jagmanaite 2008; Hailu, Cranfield, and Thangaraj 2010). In 
our model, variety 0 can correspond to a product that contains partially hydrogenated soybean oil, and 
variety 1 can correspond to a similar product that contains a substitute ingredient such as palm oil. With 
this interpretation our analysis suggests a signaling explanation of why a large share of products lacked 
detailed nutrition labeling in spite of the apparent potential for product differentiation before the 
Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990 went into effect (Caswell 1992). 
Related Literature 
An early finding in the literature on quality disclosure is that a privately informed seller voluntarily 
discloses all information if disclosure is costlessly credible (Grossman and Hart 1980, Milgrom and 
Roberts 1986). The subsequent literature demonstrated that complete unraveling breaks down and some 
nondisclosure occurs in models with costly disclosure, incomplete product information of the seller, 
irrational consumers, and competition (see Milgrom 2008 and references therein). The disclosure of 
product variety generally reveals both public (what is the overall quality of a given product) and private 
information (how far away is a given product from the buyer’s ideal variety) to each potential buyer. Then 
buyers’ private information may play the role of the disclosure “cost” because, all else equal, the seller 
can extract more surplus from buyers who have less private information. The nondisclosure result in the 
presence of private information is obtained in Sun (2010) who shows that a monopolist may not disclose 
product characteristics when consumers are uncertain about both vertical quality and horizontal attributes 
of a product. However, in the existing models of product information disclosure the attributes of a product 
are exogenous to the seller’s problem. A novel feature of our model is that consumer uncertainty about 
product characteristics is endogenous as it is driven by the seller’s supply decisions in the presence of 
input cost variability.
7   
The firm’s incentives to provide buyers with private information about their own valuations for 
its products are also studied in the literature on informative advertising (Lewis and Sappington (1994), 
Johnson and Myatt (2006), Anderson and Renault (2006), Saak (2008), and Anderson and Renault 2009). 
In contrast, following Wolinsky (1987), we focus on consumers’ uncertainty about the characteristics of a 
particular product rather than individual match values for a product with known characteristics, and 
consider a seller that can package different products with different amounts of information.  
Also, Ottaviani and Prat (2001) show that the monopolist achieves higher expected profits by 
committing to publicly reveal her private information under affiliation between the seller’s and buyers’ 
private signals. In our model there is no commitment and the seller decides which products to label with 
variety after she observes her production costs. Moscarini and Ottaviani (2001) consider buyers who are 
uncertain about their match value for a variety, and show that the sellers’ equilibrium profits may fall with 
the revelation of public information. However, they assume that each seller offers a different variety of a 
good, and do not consider multi-product sellers.   
                                                       
7Our model is also related to Levin, Peck, and Ye (2009) who consider costly quality disclosure by a multi-product 
monopolist as well as competing firms. In their model products are both vertically and horizontally differentiated, and firms 
privately observe quality before making a disclosure decision. Also, Board (2009) and Hotz and Xiao (2010) show that full 
unraveling does not occur when disclosure is costless with competition among single-product firms. Our result that in equilibrium 
labeling can be incomplete complements the study by Roe and Sheldon (2007) of the labeling of credence goods and the manner 
by which quality is communicated in a model of vertical product differentiation.  5 
2.  MODEL 
We consider an extension of Wolinsky’s (1987) model of variety labeling (brand names) that allows for 
random production costs. A risk-neutral monopolist (or seller) offers two product varieties (differentiated 
by their country of origin), 0 and 1, to a continuum of risk-neutral consumers with mass normalized to 
one. The unit production cost (wholesale price) of variety i is random and is given by  i C σ ,  1 , 0 = i . Here 
0 ≥ σ  is a scale parameter (a measure of the cost variability), and  0 C  and  1 C  are drawn from the 
symmetric continuous (unless specified otherwise) distribution function  ) , ( 1 0 c c G  with density function 
) , ( 1 0 c c g  on  ] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ × , where  ) , ( ) , ( 0 1 1 0 c c g c c g =  for all  1 0,c c . We will use  i c  to denote a realization 
of  i C . Although we assume that  0 C  and  1 C  have identical marginal distributions, they are not 
necessarily drawn independently, and may exhibit either positive or negative dependence. For example, 
positive dependence may better describe the wholesale prices for beef produced in the United States and 
Canada, whereas negative dependence may better describe the wholesale prices for grapes produced in 
the United States and Mexico which are typically not available at the same time. 
An important departure from the previous literature is that we assume that the realizations 
) , ( 1 0 c c  are observable only to the monopolist but not to consumers. Typically, consumers do not observe 
input prices in upstream markets. 
Each buyer demands one unit of variety 0 or 1 or none. Consumers differ in their ideal variety  x 
and are uniformly distributed along the interval [0,1]. A consumer whose ideal variety is x is willing to 
pay  tx q − 0  for one unit of variety 0 and  ) 1 ( 1 x t q − −  for one unit of variety 1. Here t is a measure of 
horizontal differentiation, and  i q  is a variety-specific quality shock (that is, a variety-specific common 
component of consumer valuations), which is publicly observed by the seller and consumers,  1 , 0 = i .  
If the identity of the variety offered for sale is not disclosed by the seller (that is, the product is 
not labeled with its variety), consumers cannot find out what it is prior to purchase. For example, different 
varieties of packaged foods, meats, fruits, and vegetables can be similar in appearance but differ in 
experience and credence attributes such as flavor or nutritional content. We assume that consumers are 
risk-neutral, and if a consumer at  x believes that there is probability h that the unlabeled product is of 
variety 1 (and, therefore, probability  h − 1  that the unlabeled product is of variety 0), then she is willing to 
pay  )) 1 ( ( ) )( 1 ( 1 0 x t q h tx q h − − + − −  for one unit of the unlabeled product. When deciding which product to 
buy, a consumer chooses the product that provides the greatest expected utility net of price, or stays out of 
the market and obtains a reservation utility of zero.  
We consider two information regimes: voluntary and mandatory disclosure (labeling) of a 
product’s variety. We assume that, if provided, labeling is truthful. In the voluntary labeling regime, the 
monopolist decides whether or not to label a product with variety. In the mandatory labeling regime, the 
monopolist must label each product with its variety. Even though the direct costs of information 
disclosure including labeling, testing, and keeping records may be significant, they are ignored in the 
analysis to follow. Accounting for such costs will not change our main findings that full nondisclosure 
can occur in equilibrium, and that mandatory disclosure can reduce welfare even when all consumers 
participate in the market before and after the policy is implemented.
8    
Timing of decisions is as follows. First, the buyers and the monopolist observe  i q , each buyer 
privately observes his ideal variety, x, and the monopolist privately observes her production costs  i c ,  
1 , 0 = i . Second, the monopolist sets the prices for labeled and unlabeled products,  ) , ( 1 0 c c pi ,  n i , 1 , 0 = . 
Third, having seen product prices, buyers update their beliefs about the variety of an unlabeled product (if 
it is offered for sale) and make their purchasing decisions. Finally, the monopolist produces to satisfy 
demand. 
                                                       
8 There is a large literature that studies quality disclosure when credible disclosure is costly (see Levin, Peck, and Ye (2009) 
and references therein). 6 
3.  EQUILIBRIUM 
Consider an equilibrium in which the monopolist offers labeled and unlabeled varieties. Let 
= ) , ( i i p x s ) )( 1 ( 0 tx q hi − − )) 1 ( ( 1 x t q hi − − + i p −  denote the net utility of a consumer at x who buys 
product i at price  i p ,  n i , 1 , 0 = , where  0 0 = h ,  1 1 = h , and  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ n h . A consumer at x buys product 
i if  0 ) , ( ≥ i i p x s  and  ) , ( ) , ( j j i i p x s p x s ≥  for all  i j ≠ ,  n j i , 1 , 0 , = , . Because 
) , ( ) , ( 0 0 p x s p x s n n −  and  ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 n n p x s p x s −  are increasing in x, for given prices  i p ,  n i , 1 , 0 = , the 
locations (types) of the marginal consumers who purchase variety i,  i x , and unlabeled product,  i y , are 
given by 
  )] , ( ), , ( , 0 max[ ) , ( n i n n i i i i i p x s p x s p x s − = ,  1 , 0 = i ,   (1a) 
  )] , ( , 0 max[ ) , ( i i i n i n p y s p y s = ,  1 , 0 = i    (1b) 
where  1 0 1 1 0 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ x y y x ,  0 = −i  if  1 = i  and  1 = −i  if  0 = i . In equilibrium in which both 
labeled and unlabeled products are offered, all consumers with  0 x x ≤  buy variety 0 , all consumers with 
1 0 y x y ≤ ≤  buy an unlabeled variety, and all consumers with  1 x x ≥  buy variety 1. The case with 
2
1 = n h  for parameter values such that the market is covered is illustrated in Figure 3.1. For given prices 
n p p p , , 1 0 , and consumers’ beliefs,  n h , the measures of consumers who demand one unit of product 0,1, 
and n are given by  0 1 0 0 ) , , , ( x h p p p D n n = ,  1 1 0 1 1 ) , , , ( x h p p p D n n − = , and 
0 1 1 0 ) , , , ( y y h p p p D n n n − = , where  i x ,  i y ,  1 , 0 = i , are determined by (1), and therefore depend on 
n p p p , , 1 0 , and  n h .  
Figure 3.1—Sub-markets for labeled and unlabeled products 
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
The seller chooses the variety of an unlabeled product based on the realized cost shocks. Thus, 
unlabeled product consists of variety i if  i i c c − < , so that   ] , min[ 1 0 c c cn =  is the unit cost of the 
unlabeled product. We assume that in the borderline case with  1 0 c c =  an unlabeled variety is equally 
likely to be 0 or 1. Although input costs are not directly observable to consumers, in equilibrium 
consumers correctly guess what the seller’s pricing strategy is, and therefore, they can update their beliefs 
about an unlabeled variety  n h  by observing the prices  n p p p , , 1 0 . And so, under voluntary disclosure, 
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A pure pricing strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is defined as follows. 
Definition. An equilibrium consists of consumers’ beliefs 
3
1 0
* : ) , , ( + ℜ n n p p p h ] 1 , 0 [ →  and seller’s pure 
pricing strategies  + ℜ →
2
1 0
* ] 1 , 0 [ : ) , ( c c pi ,  n i , 1 , 0 = , such that 
  (1)  for each pair of costs  ] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ ) , ( 1 0 × ∈ c c  the pricing strategies are optimal  
         given consumers’ belief  ) , , ( 1 0
*
n n p p p h : 
         n i i c c p , 1 , 0 1 0
* )} , ( { =  maximize  ) , ); , , ( , , , ( 1 0 1 0
*
1 0 c c p p p h p p p n n n π ; and 
  (2)  consumers’ belief  ) , , ( 1 0
*
n n p p p h  gives the true conditional probability that the  
          unlabeled product consists of variety 1, if the seller employs pricing strategies  
         n i i c c p , 1 , 0 1 0
* )} , ( { = : 




1 0 1 0
*
0 1 0 1 0
*
n n n n p C C p p C C p p C C p C C p p p h = = = ≥ = . 
Although in equilibrium consumers have a common belief that follows the rule of Bayesian updating, there 
are no restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium consumers’ beliefs, which may vary across consumers. We 
will allow for heterogeneous out-of-equilibrium consumers’ beliefs, whereas  n h  becomes a function of x 
(as well as the posted prices). At out-of-equilibrium prices demand functions are given by 
o
i D   ∫ Γ ∈ =
i xdx
, 
where  0 ) , ( : { ≥ = Γ i i i p x s x  and  ) , ( ) , ( j j i i p x s p x s ≥
 for all  i j ≠ ,  n j i , 1 , 0 , = } is the subset of 
consumers who demand variety i. Also, let  ) , ( : ) , , {( 1 0
*
1 0
* c c p p p p P i n = n i pi , 1 , 0 , = =  
)} , (   some for  1 0 c c  denote the set of prices generated by the pricing strategy  ) , ( 1 0
* c c pi ,  n i , 1 , 0 = .  
We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the seller achieves the greatest expected 
profit (before the seller observes her production costs), which we refer to as the “best” (for the seller) 
equilibria. There are several reasons why one may be interested in equilibria that maximize the firm’s 
expected profits. From a positive point of view, a firm that convinces its customers to play a best 
equilibrium has a higher expected valuation than any other, otherwise identical, firm, and thus is more 
likely to enter and stay in the market. From a normative point of view, this equilibrium provides a useful 
benchmark for the analysis of the mandatory disclosure policy as we can focus on the social inefficiency 
(if any) of the privately optimal disclosure and pricing strategies.  
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 π  subject to (i) and (ii),      (3) 
where  } , , { 1 0 n p p p p ≡

 is the vector of prices posted by the seller. In problem (3) constraint (i) states 
that the seller finds it optimal ex post (after she observes her production costs) to implement the pricing 
strategy that was chosen ex ante (before she observes her production costs). Constraint (ii) states that 
consumers’ beliefs are given by the true conditional probabilities along the equilibrium path. 8 
In the first portion of Section 3 we analyze the case with symmetric quality ( q q q = = 1 0 ), and in 
second part of Section 3 we analyze the case with asymmetric quality ( 1 0 q q ≠ ). 
Symmetric Quality 
As a starting point, it is useful to consider a socially efficient allocation in which each consumer gets the 
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,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x .      (4) 
In the socially efficient allocation all consumers are served for all realizations of costs if 
horizontal differentiation and cost variability are small relative to overall quality, that is, 
0 )] , ( ), , ( max[ 1 1 0 0 ≥ c x s c x s σ σ  for all  x, ] 1 , 0 [ , 1 0 ∈ c c  if  σ + ≥ t q 2
1 .
9  We first characterize 
equilibrium when this condition holds, and there are potentially profitable trades with each consumer for 
all  ] 1 , 0 [ , 1 0 ∈ c c .  
The search for a best equilibrium by directly solving (3) is a daunting task because to assure that 
there are no other equilibria in which the seller achieves a greater expected profit, we need to consider all 
possible consumers’ beliefs that follow the rule of Bayesian updating. However, the search for a best 
equilibrium is simplified by Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1. Suppose that  σ + ≥ = = t q q q 2
1
1 0 . In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium the seller’s expected 
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σ . 
To establish this upper bound on equilibrium expected profits we assume that consumers directly 
observe (noisy) signals with the content that would have been revealed had the seller committed to her 
pricing strategy before observing input prices.
10   This yields a two-stage optimization problem whereas 
the seller chooses (1) the structure of publicly observed signals, and (2) prices conditional on the public 
signals. Because we assume that these public signals arrive independently of prices, the seller cannot 
manipulate consumers’ beliefs, and the posted prices, in fact, do not reveal any additional information to 
consumers.  
In the proof of Lemma 1, we first show that in an equilibrium in which the seller achieves the 
highest expected profit, consumers may know that  ), , {( ) , ( 1 0 1 0 c c C C ∈   )} , ( 0 1 c c  for some  1 0,c c . The 
probability that  1 0 C C ≤  conditional on such signals is just the prior probability because G  is symmetric, 
                                                       




0 < σ σ s s , and some consumers are not served in the socially efficient allocation for 
) 1 , 1 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c .  
10 Recall that in equilibrium consumers use the posted prices to update their beliefs about the realized input costs. The prices 
send “noisy” public signals when the same price is offered for different input costs so that the updated probability distribution is 
not concentrated on a single point. Note that, as usual in Bayesian games, a plethora of customers’ beliefs about what the posted 
prices imply about the input costs may constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To find a system of beliefs that maximizes the 
seller’s expected profits, we use a technical trick that consists of letting the seller directly choose what customers know about the 
actual input costs. In order to assure that the information structure chosen by the seller is supported in equilibrium we require that 
the prices depend only on the public information about costs that is, directly revealed by the seller (that is, are measureable with 
respect to the public signals). 9 
∈ ≤ ) , ( | Pr( 1 0 1 0 C C C C )}) , ( ), , {( 0 1 1 0 c c c c   2
1 = . Second, we find the prices that maximize the expected 
profit conditional on  )} , ( ), , {( ) , ( 0 1 1 0 1 0 c c c c C C ∈ :  
  )}] , ( ), , {( ) , ( | ) , ; , , , ( [ max 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 2
1
1 0 , , 1 0
c c c c C C C C p p p E n p p p n
∈ π .    (5)  
If in a candidate equilibrium expected profits reach the upper bound established in Lemma 1, then 
we know that the candidate equilibrium is, in fact, a best equilibrium. It can also be shown that a best 
equilibrium is essentially unique (up to the specification of out-of-equilibrium beliefs). 















) , , (   if   ), , , , (
   ) , , (   if   ,
) , , , (
P p p p x p p p h
P p p p





n n .      (6) 
The out-of-equilibrium consumers’ beliefs  ) , , , ( 1 0 x p p p h n
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n ,      (7) 
where  1 1 ˆ = ≥x x  if  x x ˆ ≥  and  0 1 ˆ = ≥x x  if  x x ˆ < .  
Suppose that 
*
1 0 ) , , ( P p p p n ∉ . Then, in accordance with (7), for  , max[   0 p pn ≥   ] 1 p , all 
consumers believe that  n h 2
1 = . At such prices and beliefs, we have 
)] , ( ), , ( max[ ) , ( 1 1 0 0 p x s p x s p x s n n <  for all  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  (possibly with the exception of  2
1 = x ) , and there 
is no demand for the unlabeled product at positive prices. If  ] , max[ 1 0 p p pn < , then there are three 
possibilities that need to be considered. For  1 0 p p p n < ≤  (or  0 1 p p p n < ≤ ), by (7), we have 
) , ( ) , ( 0 0 p x s p x s n n ≤  (or  ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 p x s p x s n n ≤ ) for all  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x , because all consumers believe that 
the variety of unlabeled product is 0 (or 1). Hence, there is no demand for the unlabeled product because 
the labeled product 0 (or 1) is cheaper. Finally, for  ] , min[ 1 0 p p pn < , all consumers for whom 
) , ( ) ( ) , ( 1 1 0 0 p x s p x s < ≥  believe that the variety of the unlabeled product is 0 (1). Hence, 
), , ( max[ ) , ( 0 0 p x s p x s n n > )] , ( 1 1 p x s  for all  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x , and there is no demand for labeled products of 
either variety.    
  Thus, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs in (7) are such that by setting prices 
*
1 0 ) , , ( P p p p n ∉  with  ] , min[ 1 0 p p pn < , the seller earns at most  n n c t q p σ − − ] , min[ 2
1 , and by 
setting prices 
*
1 0 ) , , ( P p p p n ∉  with  ] , min[ 1 0 p p pn ≥ , the seller earns at most 
 
q p p L c c
≤ =








i c p p p D σ ,   (8) 10 




1 0 i i t
L
i p p p p D − + = − )] ( 1
i t p q−  is demand for variety i, and  ) , ( 1 0 c c L π  is the 
highest profits that the seller can achieve under full disclosure. 
Our main result is the following characterization of the best perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is, 
supported by consumers’ beliefs in (6).
11 
 
Proposition 1 (Symmetric quality). Suppose that  σ + ≥ = = t q q q 2
1
1 0 . In the best equilibrium for each 
] 1 , 0 [ ] 1 , 0 [ ) , ( 1 0 × ∈ c c   
1.  consumers do not learn which variety is cheaper for the retailer; 
2.  prices are given by  
  ] 0 |, | max[ ) , ( 1 0 4
1
1 0
* c c t q c c pi − − − = σ ,  1 , 0 = i , and  t q c c pn 2
1
1 0
* ) , ( − = ;       (9) 
3.  the market shares of each labeled and an unlabeled variety are  






0 c c c c x c c x t − − = − =
σ , and    (10) 






1 c c c c x c c x t − − − = −
σ . 
Even though the market shares of labeled varieties and the unlabeled product depend on the cost 
differential, consumers never learn which variety is cheaper. The seller offers both labeled and unlabeled 
products (or just an unlabeled product) when the cost differential is less (greater) than horizontal 
differentiation,  σ
t c c ) ( | | 1 0 ≥ < − . The unlabeled product has a dominant market share for all realizations 
of costs (it is purchased by all consumers in the interval between  ) , ( 1 0
*
0 c c x  and  ) , ( 1 0
*
1 c c x ).  
Were buyers not updating their beliefs, the seller would charge a higher (lower) price for a more 
expensive (cheaper) variety. However, in equilibrium labeled products are priced similarly in order to 
hide the identity of the cheaper variety from consumers. The price of labeled products is an increasing 
piece-wise linear function of the absolute value of the cost differential. Recall that the prices in (9) solve 
(5), and equate the marginal conditional expected profits across the three segments served with products 
n i , 1 , 0 = . Conditional expected profit in (5) can be written as 
)}] , ( ), , {( ) , ( | ) , ; , , , ( [ 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 2
1
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1 0 2 2
1
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i
n i n i σ
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1






1 0 ) , , , ( 1
i
n i p p p D ,  1 , 0 = i . The first 
equality follows because the seller charges the same prices for  ) , ( 1 0 C C ) , ( 1 0 c c =  and 
) , ( ) , ( 0 1 1 0 c c C C = . The second equality follows because the seller can substitute the cheaper variety for 
the more expensive variety when producing an unlabeled product, but he cannot do that when producing 
the labeled products. As a result, an increase in the relative cost  | | 1 0 c c − σ  calls for an expansion of the 
                                                       
11 All proofs are collected in the Appendix. 11 
submarket for an unlabeled variety that becomes relatively cheaper to produce, and contraction of the 
submarkets for the labeled varieties that, on average, become relatively more expensive to produce.   
If  t q t 2
1
2
1 + < < σ , such a pricing strategy may no longer be optimal for some input costs. In 
this case, if both varieties are too expensive, the seller may achieve higher profits by offering labeled 
varieties at different prices and revealing the identity of the cheaper variety. The following example 
illustrates. 
 
Example 1. (Equilibrium with partial and pure labeling)  Let  1 = = = σ t q  ( < < q t 2
1 σ   t 2
1 +  holds). 
The total profit (sum over the three commodities) from charging not revealing prices in (9) is given by  




1 0 c c c c c c n − + − − = π .  (12) 
However, there is another pricing strategy that may generate higher profits. By offering only 
labeled varieties at “revealing” prices  2
1
1 0 ) , (
i c L
i c c p








1 0 ) 1 ( ) , (
i
i L c c c π .          (13) 
By comparing (12) and (13), we see that the seller achieves higher profits by offering only 
labeled products if both varieties are sufficiently expensive, that is,  ) , ( ) , ( 1 0 1 0 c c c c n L π π ≥  if 
≥ ] , min[ 1 0 c c 1 ] , max[ 2 ] , max[ 4 1 0 1 0 − − + c c c c  (see Figure 3.2). Note that with symmetric quality 
the seller is equally likely to achieve higher profits by posting “revealing” prices  2
1
1 0 ) , (
i c
i c c p
+ = , 
1 , 0 = i  when  1 0 C C >  or  1 0 C C < . Therefore, the buyers do not learn any new information when the 
seller posts “non-revealing” prices in (9). ■ 
Figure 3.2—Variety disclosure and input costs with low symmetric quality 
 
Source: Author’s creation. 12 
Next we investigate whether an increase in cost variability increases or decreases the supply of an 





* c c x c c x Dn − = . For  ) , 0 [ 2
1 t q − ∈ σ , as can be seen from (10), a small 
increase in σ  has a positive effect on 
*
n D . However, as Example 1 demonstrates, for  t q 2
1 − ≥ σ  there is 
no market for unlabeled products at all, if both  0 c  and  1 c  are sufficiently close to 1. And so, assuming 
that  1 0,C C  are independently drawn from a uniform distribution, the effect of σ  on the expected market 








1 )) , ( ) , ( ( dc dc c c x c c x , is non-monotone as shown in Figure 
3.3, where  2 = q  and  1 = t . 
Figure 3.3—Expected market share of unlabeled products and cost variability 
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
Finally, if  t q 2
1 ≤ , the seller never offers unlabeled products in equilibrium. If the idiosyncratic 
component of consumer valuations (horizontal differentiation) is too large, uncertainty about the variety 
of the unlabeled product eliminates demand for it.  
Asymmetric Quality 
We now suppose that varieties 0 and 1 differ in overall quality, and assume that  0 1 0 > − = ∆ q q .
12  
When the quality differential and cost variability are small relative to the horizontal differentiation, 
t ≤ + ∆ σ , and the average quality is high relative to the cost variability and horizontal differentiation, 
t q q q 2
1
1 0 2
1 ) ( + ≥ = + σ , in the best equilibrium consumers do not glean any new information from 
prices about the relative input costs. As in the case with symmetric quality, in equilibrium prices 
maximize expected profit conditional on  )} , ( ), , {( ) , ( 0 1 1 0 1 0 c c c c C C ∈  for some  1 0,c c  (see (5)): 
 
t q p q p q p n 2
1
1 1 0 0 , , max
− ≤ ≤ ≤ )}] , ( ), , {( ) , ( | ) , ; , , , ( [ 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 2
1
1 0 c c c c C C C C p p p E n ∈ π   (14)  










1 0 ( ) , , , ( p p p p D t n n =   ) 2 1 n p p − + ,  1 , 0 = i .  
                                                       
12 The case with   0 < ∆  is analogous. 13 
It is easy to verify that the prices at which (14) achieves its maximum are given by: 







* c c t i q c c pi − − − ∆ − + = σ ,  1 , 0 = i , and  t q c c pn 2
1
1 0
* ) , ( − = .  (15) 
Using arguments that are similar to the ones used to establish Proposition 1 it can be shown that 
constraint (i) in problem (3) is satisfied for all  1 0,c c , when the system of consumers’ beliefs is given by 
(6) but with the set of equilibrium prices 
* P  that is, generated by the pricing strategy in (15), and the out-
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n .      (16) 
(16) assures that the seller does not gain from deviating from the announced pricing strategy in (15) for 
any  1 0,c c . Thus, the pricing strategy in (15) combined with this system of consumers’ beliefs constitute 
an equilibrium. The variation in equilibrium prices for labeled varieties in (15) only reflects the difference 
in overall quality but reveals nothing about the identity of the cheaper variety. Although the seller offers 
the labeled high-quality and low-quality varieties and an unlabeled variety, the market share of the labeled 
high-quality variety is greater than that of the low-quality variety. 
When the quality differential and cost variability are large relative to the horizontal 
differentiation,  t > ∆ + σ , or the average quality is low relative to cost variability and horizontal 
differentiation,  t q 2
1 + <σ , in the best equilibrium consumers may learn from prices about which variety 
is likely to be cheaper. A characterization of the best equilibrium will now depend on the distribution of 
costs, G . To investigate the effect of quality asymmetry on the equilibrium pricing strategy and the 
patterns of disclosure, we consider a special case when input costs take only two values and exhibit 
perfect negative dependence with  )) 0 , 1 ( ) , Pr(( 1 0 = C C 2
1
1 0 )) 1 , 0 ( ) , Pr(( = = = C C .  
For this distribution of costs, in a pure pricing strategy equilibrium, prices necessarily convey 
either null or full information about the actual costs. To see why, suppose that in equilibrium the seller 
offers an unlabeled variety for  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c  and  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ n h . Then the seller must (ex post) set the 
same prices for  ) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c  as well. Otherwise, with only two possible outcomes (either 
) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( 1 0 = C C  or  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 0 = C C ) consumers, who know the seller’s pricing strategy, will easily infer 
from the posted prices which variety is cheaper.  
And so, if in the best equilibrium the seller offers an unlabeled variety, then the equilibrium is 
given by the solution to the following problem:   
  ∑








1 1 0 0
) , , , , , ( max
c c
n
t q p q p q p
c c p p p
n
π  subject to       (17a) 
  ) , ( ) , , , , , ( 1 0 1 0 2
1
1 0 c c c c p p p L n π π ≥  for  )} 1 , 0 { ), 0 , 1 {( ) , ( 1 0 ∈ c c ,    (17b) 
where  
1 , 0 , 1 0 max ) , (
= ≤ =
i q p L
i i




1 0 ) )( , (
i




1 0 i i t i p p p p D − + = −  
, ) ( 2 2
1 ∆ − + i )] ( 1
i i t p q −  is demand for variety i if the seller deviates from the non-revealing prices. If 14 
there exist no prices  n p p p , , 1 0  such that the “implementation” constraints (17b) simultaneously hold, 
then in the best equilibrium the seller offers only labeled varieties and earns  ∑






L c c π . 
By solving (17) we obtain the following characterization of the best equilibrium that is, supported 
by the consumers’ beliefs in (6) and the out-of-equilibrium beliefs in (16). 
Proposition 2 (Asymmetric quality). Suppose that  ) , Pr(( )) 0 , 1 ( ) , Pr(( 1 0 1 0 C C C C = =   2
1 )) 1 , 0 ( = = , 
1 ) ( 1 0 2
1 = = + t q q , and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ ∆ . In the best equilibrium the seller offers for each 
)} 1 , 0 ( ), 0 , 1 {( ) , ( 1 0 ∈ c c  
1.  all three products at  4
3
0
σ + ∆ + = p ,  4
3
1
σ + ∆ − = p , and  2
1 = n p , if  ∆ − ≤1 σ ; 
2.  the labeled high-quality and an unlabeled variety at 4
3
0
σ + ∆ + = p  and  2
1 = n p  
if  ∆ + < < ∆ − 1 1 σ  and  ) 1 2 ( 2 − ≤ ∆ , or  ∆ + ≤ < ∆ − 2
1 1 1 σ  and  ) 1 2 ( 2 − > ∆ ; 
3.  the labeled high-quality and an unlabeled variety at  4
) 2 5 ( 3
0
∆ − + ∆ + = p  and  2
1 = n p , 
if  




∆ − − ∆ +
∆ ≤ < ∆ + σ  and  ) 1 2 ( 2 − > ∆ ; 
4.  only an unlabeled variety at  2
1 = n p , if  ∆ + ≥1 σ  and  ) 1 2 ( 2 − ≤ ∆ ; 




0 ∆ + = p  for  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c  or  




1 ∆ − = p  for  ) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c ,  
if 
) 2 5 1 (
2
∆ − − ∆ +
∆ > σ  and  ) 1 2 ( 2 − > ∆ . 
Figure 3.4 depicts the combinations of quality differentials and cost volatilities for which 
different types of pricing strategies are employed in equilibrium. The seller may offer labeled high-quality 
and low-quality and an unlabeled variety (area 1), only labeled high-quality and an unlabeled variety 
(areas 2 and 3), only an unlabeled variety (area 4), or only labeled varieties (area 5). 






















Source: Author’s creations. 15 
If  ∆ − ≤1 σ  (area 1), the seller offers all three products (this is a special case of the pricing 
strategy in (15)). The price premium for the high-quality variety (and its market share) increases with the 
quality differential. As in the case with symmetric quality, the prices of both labeled varieties increase and 
their market shares fall when cost variability is greater.  
If cost variability is in some intermediate range,  ∆ + < < ∆ − 1 1 σ  and  ) 1 2 ( 2 − ≤ ∆ , or 
∆ + ≤ < ∆ − 2
1 1 1 σ  and  ) 1 2 ( 2 − > ∆ , the seller only labels the high-quality variety and expands the 
share of the market served with an unlabeled variety (area 2). In this case, the low-quality variety is 
unattractive even for consumers whose ideal variety is close to 1, and the seller does not create a niche 
market for that variety.  
If the quality differential is sufficiently large,  ) 1 2 ( 2 − > ∆ , and the cost variability is large (but 
not too large), 




∆ − − ∆ +
∆ ≤ < ∆ + σ , the implementation constraint (17b) binds when the high-quality 
variety is cheap (area 3). Then in equilibrium with  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c  the seller is indifferent between 
offering (a) a menu of the labeled high-quality and an unlabeled variety, and (b) posting revealing prices 
and offering just the labeled high-quality variety at a lower price. The loss in profits for  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c  
due to such a reduction in the price of the high-quality variety is offset by the gain in profits for 
) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c  when the seller can keep it a secret that the unlabeled product consists of the low-quality 
variety.  
If the quality differential is not too large,  ) 1 2 ( 2 − ≤ ∆ , and the cost variability is sufficiently  
large,  ∆ + ≥1 σ , the seller offers only an unlabeled variety (area 4). Even when the high-quality variety 
is cheaper, the seller serves the entire market with an unlabeled product because lowering the price for the 
labeled high-quality variety will reveal to consumers the identity of the unlabeled product. The seller 
achieves higher expected profits from offering a single product of an unknown variety (complete 
nondisclosure) than being forced to offer the labeled high-quality variety when it is expensive. 
Finally, if both the quality differential and the cost variability are sufficiently large, 
) 1 2 ( 2 − > ∆  and 
) 2 5 1 (
2
∆ − − ∆ +
∆ > σ , the seller achieves the highest expected profits by adjusting prices in 
response to the changes in costs, and offers only the labeled varieties (area 5).  
Unlike in the case with symmetric quality, the “pricing strategy implementation” constraint for 
) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c  in (17b) binds when the quality differential is large. Because non-revealing prices 
maximize the seller’s expected profits, were consumers unable to learn from the posted prices, the seller 
would prefer to lower the price of the labeled high-quality variety when its actual cost is low. If the gain 
in profits from serving a larger share of the market with the labeled high-quality variety is sufficiently 
great, the seller, in fact, prefers to post revealing prices. Of course, this would be anticipated by 
consumers and ruin the seller’s ability to offer an unlabeled variety when the high-quality variety is 
expensive,  ) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c .  
 16 
4.  MANDATORY DISCLOSURE  
In this section we consider the effect of mandatory labeling of products with their variety on welfare. We 
begin with the case when quality is symmetric and sufficiently high,  q q q = = 1 0 σ + ≥ t . Then under 
both voluntary and mandatory labeling the market is covered (each consumer trades with the seller) for 
any realization of costs. As a result, mandatory labeling only affects the allocation of varieties across 
consumers but not the number of consumers who participate in the market.  
Under mandatory labeling the equilibrium prices maximize (8), and are given by (see the proof of 




1 0 i i
L
i c c t q c c p − − − = − σ ) , ( 1 0
* c c pi ≤ ,  1 , 0 = i , for all  1 0,c c , where the 
inequality follows by (9). And so, each consumer gains under mandatory labeling. Consumers who used 
to purchase the labeled varieties under voluntary labeling are better off because their prices decrease. 
Consumers who used to purchase an unlabeled variety do not lose anything from not being offered an 
unlabeled product, but gain from the reduction in prices for the labeled varieties.
13   
Next we consider the effect of mandatory labeling on social welfare. Let us compare the 
monopolist’s solution under voluntary and mandatory labeling with the socially efficient allocation. 
Suppose that variety 0 is cheaper to produce than variety 1,  1 0 c c ≤  (the case with  1 0 c c ≥  is analogous). 





1 min[ ) , ( = ≤ c c x x   ] 1 ), ( 0 1 4 c c t − +
σ  consume variety 0 (this includes all consumers who buy labeled 
variety 0 and the unlabeled product, that is,  + 0 D n D  evaluated at equilibrium prices), and the rest 
consume variety 1. Under mandatory labeling all consumers with 
) , ( 1 0 1 c c x x
M ≤ ] 1 ), ( min[ 0 1 4 2
1 c c t − + = σ  consume variety 0 (this includes all consumers who derive a 
non-negative surplus from purchasing variety 0 at  ) , ( 1 0 0 c c p
L ), and the rest consume variety 1. In the 
socially efficient allocation, by (4), all consumers with  2
1
1 0 1 min[ ) , ( = ≤ c c x x
s   ] 1 ), ( 0 1 2 c c t − +
σ  consume 
variety 0 (that is, all consumers for whom  ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 0 0 c x s c x s σ σ ≥ ), and the rest consume variety 1.  
Therefore, the seller oversupplies (undersupplies) the cheaper variety under voluntary 
(mandatory) labeling provided that the input cost differential is not too great:  ) , ( 1 0 1 c c x
M  
) , ( ) , ( 1 0
*
1 1 0 1 c c x c c x
s < < , if  ) , 0 ( 0 1 σ
t c c ∈ −  and  ) , ( ) , ( 1 0 1 1 0 1 c c x c c x
s M <   1 ) , ( 1 0
* = = c c x , if 
) 2 , [ 0 1 σ σ
t t c c ∈ − . For very large cost differentials the monopolist’s and socially efficient allocation 
coincide: all consumers are served with the cheaper variety if  σ
t c c 2 0 1 ≥ − .  Figure 4.1 depicts the shares 
of consumers who get variety 0 in the socially efficient allocation and in monopoly under voluntary and 
mandatory labeling with  1 , 2
5 = = t σ . And so, mandatory policy reduces (conversely, increases) the 
distortion in the relative supply of each variety for small (conversely, large) cost differentials. 
Now we can easily determine the effect of mandatory labeling on welfare. Let 
) , ( 1 0
* c c W ) , ), , ( ( 1 0 1 0
*
1 c c c c x W =  and  ) , ( 1 0 c c W
M ) , ), , ( ( 1 0 1 0 c c c c x W
M =  denote social welfare (the 
sum of consumers’ surplus and seller’s profits) in equilibrium under voluntary and mandatory labeling for 
given  1 0,c c , where  ∫ − − =
x
dx c tx q c c x W
ˆ
0 0 1 0 ) ( ) , , ˆ ( σ   ∫ − − − +
1
ˆ 1) ) 1 ( (
x dx c x t q σ  is social welfare when 
all consumers with  x x ˆ ≤  ( x x ˆ > ) are served with variety 0 (1). 
                                                       
13 Note that the monopolist extracts the entire expected surplus from the buyers of an unlabeled variety. If consumers’ 
valuations for varieties 0 and 1 are drawn independently both across varieties and across consumers (see Perloff and Salop 1985), 
consumers with high and similar valuations for both varieties will enjoy some surplus from purchasing an unlabeled variety. 
Under a more general specification of preferences, it is possible that consumers are worse off under mandatory labeling.  17 
Figure 4.1—Supply of the cheap variety and cost differential  
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
Proposition 3. Suppose that  σ + ≥ = = t q q q 1 0 . Then  ) , ( ) , ( 1 0 1 0
* c c W c c W
M <  for all 
σ
t c c 2
1
1 0 | | < − ,  ) , ( ) , ( 1 0 1 0
* c c W c c W
M ≥  for all  σ σ
t t c c 2 | | 1 0 2
1 ≤ − ≤ , and  ) , ( ) , ( 1 0 1 0
* c c W c c W
M =  
for all  σ
t c c 2 | | 1 0 ≥ − . 
The effect of mandatory labeling on social welfare is positive for small cost differentials, it is 
negative for cost differentials in some intermediate range, and it is null for large cost differentials.  
Figure 4.2 illustrates the effect of mandatory disclosure on ex ante expected social welfare 
(before cost shocks are known) when costs are drawn independently from the uniform distribution, that is, 




0 1 0 1 0
*
1 0 )) , ( ) , ( ( dc dc c c W c c W
M  as a function of σ  for  1 = t  and  σ + ≥ t q . For small 
σ  it is likely that  σ
t c c 2
1
1 0 | | < − , which, as shown in Proposition 3, implies that the effect of the policy 
on welfare is likely positive. However, for large σ , it is likely that  σ
t c c 2
1
1 0 | | ≥ − , and the losses in 
social welfare due to mandatory labeling, on average, offset the welfare gains that are achieved when 
costs are similar across varieties. 18 
Figure 4.2—The effect of mandatory labeling on expected welfare and cost variability 
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
Also, it is of interest to investigate how the degree of correlation between cost shocks (keeping 
the marginal distribution fixed) affects conditions under which mandatory labeling increases expected 
social welfare. When shocks are more positively (negatively) dependent, small (large) cost differentials 
are more likely, which implies that welfare is more likely to increase (decrease) under mandatory 
labeling. For example, if the shocks exhibit perfect positive dependence, that is,  1 ) Pr( 1 0 = = C C , the ex 
post welfare necessarily increases under mandatory labeling. On the other hand, if the shocks exhibit 
perfect negative dependence, that is,  1 ) 1 Pr( 1 0 = − = C C , and are drawn from a uniform distribution, 
then  )] , ( [ ) ( )] , ( [ 1 0 1 0
* C C W E C C W E
M ≥ <  depending on whether  σ ) (≤ > t . To summarize, mandatory 
labeling tends to decrease expected social welfare when cost variability is large and shocks are negatively 
correlated. 
If  q
t ≤ +σ 2 σ + < t , mandatory labeling affects not only the allocation of varieties across 
consumers but also the total number of consumers who participate in the market. As in the case of the 
covered market, prices for labeled varieties maximize (8) and fall under mandatory labeling 




i c q c c p σ + = ) , ( 1 0
* c c pi ≤ ,  1 , 0 = i , and consumers are made better off by the policy as they 
enjoy lower prices without suffering any loss from not being offered an unlabeled variety. However, 
social welfare is now more likely to decrease because fewer consumers participate in the market under 
mandatory labeling even though some trade between the seller and each consumer is better than no 
trade.
14   
Finally, if  σ + < < 2 2
t t q , the price for the more expensive labeled variety  increases after the 
policy goes into effect. Nonetheless, the overall impact on consumer welfare (as a group) remains 
positive, and the impact on social welfare is ambiguous as in the previous two cases. For  2
t q ≤ , the 
policy has no effect, because the seller never offers an unlabeled variety. 
                                                       
14 Because the market is necessarily covered when the seller offers an unlabeled product, mandatory labeling can only 
decrease the number of consumers who participate in the market. Wolinsky (1987) showed that mandatory labeling may decrease 
social welfare because of its effect on the market size.  19 
Mandatory Disclosure with Asymmetric Quality 
Now we consider the effect of mandatory disclosure on welfare when quality is asymmetric across 
varieties with  0 1 0 > − = ∆ q q . For moderate quality asymmetry, compared with the symmetric quality 
case, mandatory disclosure is more (less) likely to decrease overall welfare when the high-quality variety 
is cheaper (more expensive) than the low-quality variety. Suppose that quality asymmetry and cost 
variability are small relative to the variability in idiosyncratic valuations,  t ≤ + ∆ < σ 0 , and the average 
quality is high, q σ + ≥ t .
15     
In this case under mandatory labeling the equilibrium prices are given by  
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where the inequality follows by (15), which confirms that consumers are made better off. Now the supply 
of the high-quality variety under mandatory labeling is given by  t t
M c c c c x 4 0 1 4 2
1
1 0 1 ) ( ) , ( ∆ + − + =
σ , 
whereas under the socially efficient allocation it is given by  t t
s c c c c x 2 0 1 2 2
1
1 0 1 ) ( ) , ( ∆ + − + =
σ . For 
1 0 c c ≤  ( 1 0 c c > ) the supply of the high-quality variety under voluntary labeling is given by 
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As shown in (18), a greater quality asymmetry decreases (increases)  ) , ( 1 0 c c W
M   ) , ( 1 0
* c c W −  
for  1 0 c c ≤  ( 1 0 c c > ). As the quality differential, ∆, increases, for  1 0 c c ≤  the distortion due to the 
undersupply of the high-quality variety worsens under mandatory labeling relative to the distortion due to 
the oversupply of the high-quality variety under voluntary labeling. But, for  1 0 c c >  the distortion due to 
the undersupply of the high-quality variety is less severe under mandatory labeling relative to the 
distortion due to the undersupply of the high-quality variety under voluntary labeling.  
Yet, a small increase in quality asymmetry has no impact on the change in expected social 
welfare due to full disclosure,  0 / )] , ( ) , ( [ 1 0
*
1 0 = ∆ − d C C W C C W dE
M , because the distribution of 
1 0,C C  is symmetric. This is because a small increase in quality asymmetry increases the supply of the 
high-quality variety at the same rate before and after mandatory disclosure. 
Nonetheless, for large quality asymmetry mandatory disclosure may increase expected social 
welfare even when relative input cost variability is large. Consider the special case with negatively 
dependent binary cost shocks in Section 3 and suppose that  ∆ + >1 σ  and  ) 1 2 ( 2 − < ∆  (area IV in 
Figure 3.3). With these parameters the seller supplies only the least-cost variety before and after the 
policy, but the market size under mandatory disclosure depends on which variety is cheaper. Under 
                                                       
15 The first condition assures that the seller finds it optimal to target the segments of consumers with strong preference for a 
particular variety and the segment of indifferent consumers with offers tailored to their preferences (that is, labeled “0”, “1”, and 
an unlabeled product). The second condition assures that the market is covered before and after the policy, so that the policy only 
affects the relative varietal supply rather than the overall volume of sales. 20 
voluntary labeling we have  1 ) 1 , 0 (
*
1 = x  and  0 ) 0 , 1 (
*
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* )] , ( [ = C C W E . Under mandatory labeling, as shown in 
the proof of Proposition 2, the supply of variety 0 is  0 2
1 q  for   ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c , and the supply of variety 1 
is  1 2
1 q  for  ) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c , so that   ∫ − =
0 5 . 0
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q M dx x q W  
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1 0 ∆ + = C C W E
M . And so, for 
3
1 > ∆  mandatory labeling 
increases expected social welfare and the gain in welfare is increasing with ∆. If quality asymmetry is 
sufficiently large, welfare gains from avoiding overconsumption of the low-quality variety when 
) 0 , 1 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c  offset welfare losses from underconsumption of the high-quality variety when 
) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c .  
 21 
5.  COMPETITION 
Here we show that product variety may not be disclosed in equilibrium with competition among multi-
product sellers. Consider a market with two spatially differentiated firms, A and B, that are located at the 
opposite ends of the “street” of unit length (see Figure 5.1). Both firms source varieties, 0 and 1, in the 
same upstream market (that is, the realizations of  1 0,C C  are common to both firms). Firms are price-
takers in the upstream market but independently choose prices and disclosure strategy in the downstream 
market.  
Figure 5.1—Spatially differentiated firms and purchasing decisions 
 
Source: Author’s creation. 
Now each buyer is characterized by two “location” parameters  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ d , where, as 
before, x is the location of the buyer’s ideal variety in the product space, and d  is the buyer’s address on 
the street. For each buyer his taste x and address d  are drawn independently from a uniform distribution 
on the unit interval. A consumer with  ) , ( d x  who buys a unit of variety  n i , 1 , 0 =  from firm A 
(respectively, B) at price  A i p ,  ( B i p , ) obtains expected utility  d p x s A i i β − ) , ( ,  (respectively,   ) , ( ,B i i p x s  
) 1 ( d − − β ), where β  is the traveling cost (both ways) per unit of distance. We assume that the traveling 
cost is not too high,  < < β 0 2
t q − , so that firms are in direct competition with each other. We also 
suppose that cost shocks are binary and negatively dependent, 
)) 0 , 1 ( ) , Pr(( 1 0 = C C 2
1
1 0 )) 1 , 0 ( ) , Pr(( = = = C C , and cost variability is high,  σ ≤ = = q q q 1 0 , so that in 
equilibrium only variety i with  0 = i c  is offered for sale.  
Consider an equilibrium in which both firms offer only an unlabeled variety, and consumers’ 
beliefs are unchanged from their priors. That is,  2
1
, , = = = n B n A n h h h , so that 
j n j n n p t q p x s , 2
1
, ) , ( − − = ,  B A j , = , where  j n h ,  is the consumers’ belief that an unlabeled product 22 
supplied by firm  j  consists of variety 1. We assume that in equilibrium all consumers are served in the 
market. Then all consumers with  
  ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ( ) , ( , , d p x s d p x s B n n A n n − − < ≥ − β β   (19) 
buy one unit of an unlabeled variety from firm A (conversely, firm B). And so, by (19), all consumers 
with  β 2
, , 1 ˆ ) (
A n B n p p d d
− + = > ≤  shop at firm A (B), and each firm earns 
    j n
p p
B n A n j
t q p
p p p












− + = ,  B A j , = .      (20) 
It is easy to verify that the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium (conditional on both firms offering only an 
unlabeled variety) is given by  β = = B n A n p p , , , and each firm earns  β 2
1 . 
Now we show that neither firm wants to deviate and offer a labeled product.  Suppose to the 
contrary that a firm deviates and offers a labeled variety (possibly along with an unlabeled variety). Then 
consumers immediately find out which variety is cheaper because  σ ≤ q  and firms will never supply the 
more expensive variety. This leads to full disclosure of the identity of the variety that is, offered by both 
firms. Suppose that  ) 1 , 0 ( ) , ( 1 0 = c c . If firm A deviates and offers labeled variety 0 at  A p , 0 , then all 
consumers with  
  d p tx q d p x s A A β β − − − = − , 0 , 0 0 ) , ( ] 0 ), 1 ( max[ , d p tx q B n − − − − ≥ β ,  (21) 
will shop at firm A, where  β = B n p , . And so, firm A that labels its products earns at most 
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− = + = , 
where the first equality follows by (21), and the last equality follows by (20). This shows that neither firm 
can gain from labeling its products. Furthermore, the inequality in (22) is strict, and therefore each firm 
strictly loses from deviating for  > β 2
t q− . 
Competition does not necessarily lead to disclosure of the identity of the currently available 
variety because labeling cannot increase sales for the disclosing firm. On the one hand, consumers, who 
prefer the currently available variety, are attracted by the cheap unlabeled product offered by the 
competitor (that consumers now know consists of their preferred variety). On the other hand, consumers, 
who prefer the currently unavailable variety and were previously purchasing an unlabeled variety, may 
now prefer to stay out of the market.
16    
                                                       
16 Wolinsky (1987) considers a duopoly model where each firm i supplies a single variety (brand) i  and consumers cannot 
distinguish between brands (that is, between characteristics of products supplied by different firms) unless they are labeled as 
such. 23 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed a theory of product information disclosure through labeling by a multi-product firm 
that faces random input costs. Compared to the literature on quality disclosure (Milgrom 2008), the 
approach adopted in this paper is more general since it allows for “incomplete disclosure,” that is, the 
case in which the firm can optimally choose to simultaneously supply the products with disclosed and 
undisclosed attributes. In our model nondisclosure of variety is due to two-sided uncertainty whereas 
consumers do not know which variety is cheaper to supply and the firm does not observe buyers’ 
preferences.  
The main findings of the paper are that  
1.  full nondisclosure can occur in equilibrium even when disclosure per se is costless. 
2.  mandatory disclosure can reduce welfare even when all consumers participate in the market 
before and after the policy is implemented and when the implementation of the policy does 
not add additional costs.  
3.  competition might not lead to disclosure.  
We show that the extent of nondisclosure depends on the difference in overall quality, heterogeneity in 
consumer preferences, and cost variability. Our finding that in imperfectly competitive markets regulation 
by transparency may not automatically increase welfare is explained by distortions in allocation of 
varieties across consumers that continue to exist under full disclosure. Specifically, we show that 
mandatory disclosure of variety decreases welfare when relative input costs are volatile and varieties are 
similar in overall quality. In our model mandatory disclosure may not only reduce the size of the market, 
but also worsen the distortion in the allocation of the market shares across varieties: the market share 
allocated to the cheaper variety tends to be too large under voluntary disclosure, but it tends to be too 
small under mandatory disclosure.  
When varieties are differentiated by experience attributes, a more realistic assumption is that 
consumers are initially uninformed about their valuations for different varieties and slowly learn about 
them by purchasing different products over time (Bergemann and Valimaki 2006). With consumer 
learning the provision of information about product variety has two additional “dynamic” effects that are 
absent in the static setting:  
1.  Inexperienced consumers (that is, those who have not tried one or both varieties) are willing 
to pay more because they will be able to make better purchasing decisions in the future if they 
know which variety they buy today;  
2.  Incompletely experienced consumers (that is, those who have tried only one variety) with 
negative experiences may buy less frequently because they stop buying the variety for which 
they have low valuations as soon as they learn about it.  
An interesting distinction is whether, without labels, consumers can tell which varieties they have already 
tried. If they cannot, withholding the identity of a product’s variety benefits the seller because consumers 
with low valuations buy more frequently and stay in the market longer as they are not sure whether or not 
they have encountered both varieties in their previous trials and keep on hoping that the variety that they 
like is still out there. Our goal in future work is to sort out these effects and to explore optimal disclosure 
of product characteristics in a dynamic model with consumer learning.  24 
APPENDIX 
To prove Lemma 1 it will be useful to establish the following property of the profit function. Let denote 
the maximum profits for given costs  1 0,c c  and fixed consumers’ beliefs  n h  (here  n h  is a constant 
number rather than a function of the posted prices). 
  ) , , , , , ( max ) , , ( ˆ 1 0 1 0 , , 1 0
1 0
c c h p p p c c h n n p p p n
n
π π =    (A1) 
Lemma 0. Suppose that  σ + ≥ = = t q q q 2
1
1 0 . Then  ) , , ( ˆ 1 0 c c hn π  is unimodal in  n h  with the peak at 
2
1 = n h  for all  ] 1 , 0 [ , 1 0 ∈ c c . 
 
Proof:  Suppose that  1 0 c c ≤  and consider the seller’s problem of choosing prices to maximize 
) , , , , , ( 1 0 1 0 c c h p p p n n π  for given fixed  n h ,  0 c , and  1 c .  
If  ) , 0 ( 2
1 ∈ n h , then  x p x s x p x s x p x s n n ∂ ∂ < < ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ / ) , ( 0 / ) , ( / ) , ( 1 1 0 0 . Hence, provided that 
all three products are offered, (1) becomes:  
) , ( )) 1 ( ( ) )( 1 ( ) , ( 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n n n n n p x s p x t q h tx q h p tx q p x s = − − − + − − = − − =     (A2) 
0 )) 1 ( ( ) )( 1 ( ) , ( 1 1 1 0 1 = − − − + − − = n n n n n p y t q h ty q h p y s  
0 ) 1 ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 = − − − = p x t q p x s , 
where  1 0 1 1 0 0 ≤ ≤ < = ≤ x y y x . To proceed, it will be convenient to work with the system of inverse 
demand functions whereas prices  i p ,  n i , 1 , 0 = , are functions of the marginal types  i x  and  i y ,  1 , 0 = i , 
and consumers’ beliefs  n h . From (A2) it follows that  ) , ( ) , , ( 1 1 0 0 n n n h y p h y x p = ) 2 1 ( 0 x thn − + , 
)) 1 ( ) 1 (( ) , ( 1 1 1 y h y h t q h y p n n n n − + − − = , and  ) 1 ( ) ( 1 1 1 x t q x p − − = . And so, the profit function can 
be rewritten as  ) , , , , , ( 1 0 1 1 0 c c h x y x n π ) ) , , ( ( 0 1 0 0 0 c h y x p x n σ − = ) ) , ( )( ( 0 1 0 1 c h y p x y n n σ − − +  
) ) ( )( 1 ( 1 1 1 1 c x p x σ − − + . 
Similarly, if  ) 1 , ( 2
1 ∈ n h , then the profit function becomes  ) , , , , , ( 1 0 1 0 0 c c h x y x n π  
) ) , ( )( ( ) ) ( ( 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 c h y p y x c x p x n n σ σ − − + − = ) 1 ( 1 x − + ) ) , , ( ( 1 1 0 1 c h x y p n σ − , where 
0 0 0 ) ( tx q x p − = ,  )) 1 ( ) 1 (( ) , ( 0 0 0 y h y h t q h y p n n n n − + − − = , and  ) , , ( 1 0 1 n h x y p  
) , ( 0 n n h y p = ) 2 1 )( 1 ( 1 x h t n − − − . 
Because  ) , , , , , ( 1 0 1 1 0 c c h x y x n π  is linear in  n h  on  ) , 0 ( 2
1  and  ) , , , , , ( 1 0 1 0 0 c c h x y x n π  is linear 
in  n h  on  ) 1 , ( 2
1 , by the envelope theorem, it follows that  ) , , ( ˆ 1 0 c c hn π  achieves its maximum at  2
1 = n h  
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By comparing (A3) and (A4), it follows that  ) , , 0 ( ˆ ) , , 1 ( ˆ 1 0 1 0 c c c c π π ≥  for all  ] 1 , 0 [ , 1 0 ∈ c c , and 
so we only need to show that  
  ) , , 1 ( ˆ ) , , ( ˆ 1 0 1 0 2
1 c c c c π π ≥ .           (A6) 
By comparing (A4) and (A5), it immediately follows that (A6) holds when  0 c t q σ + > . And so, 
it only remains to show that (A6) also holds when  0 c t q σ + ≤ . Note that   0 2
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Because the left-hand side of (A7) is non-increasing in  1 c , we are done if we show that (A7) 
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which verifies that (A7) holds. ■ 
Proof of Lemma 1:  The proof proceeds in three steps. In Step 1, we restate (3) as a problem of 
optimizing over public signals and pricing strategy conditional on those signals. In Step 2, we show that 
public signals should be uninformative about the identity of the cheaper variety. In Step 3, we derive the 
exact formula. 
Step 1. Suppose that in a best equilibrium the pure pricing strategy is a garbled signal of relative costs, 
that is, 
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Source: Author’s creation. 
 27 
Step 2. It is convenient to view (A9) as a two-stage optimization problem: (1) find maximum profits for 
given  ∈ z C Ω, and (2) find an optimal Ω. We first show that at optimum  2
1 ) C ( = z n h  for each  z . We 
argue by contradiction. So suppose that there exists  Ω ∈ k C  with  2
1 ) C ( < k n h  (the case with 
2
1 ) C ( > k n h  is analogous). Without loss of generality, we focus on a symmetric solution whereas for 
each  Ω ∈ z C  there exists a “mirror” set  s C Ω ∈ ,  s z ≠ , such that  z c c C ) , ( 1 0 ∈  if and only if 
s c c C ) , ( 0 1 ∈ . Then, by symmetry, there also exists  Ω ∈ l C  with   
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so that  2
1 ) C ( 1 ) C ( > − = k n l n h h . This is illustrated in the first panel in Figure A.1. 
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The first (strict) inequality follows because, by assumption,  ) C ( ) C
~
( z n z n h h =  and 
)) C ( ), C ( ), C
~
( ( ˆ )) C ( ), C ( ), C ( ( ˆ 1 0 1 0 z z z n z z z n c c h c c h π π =  for all  l k z , ≠ , and 
)) C ( ), C ( ), C
~
( ( ˆ )) C ( ), C ( ), C ( ( ˆ 1 0 1 0 z z z n z z z n c c h c c h π π <  for  l k z , = , where the inequality follows from 
Lemma 0 because, by construction,  ) C ( ) C
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1
l n z n k n h h h < = < .  The second inequality follows 28 
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The first equality follows by (A1) and (A12). The inequality follows because re-optimization over 
prices cannot decrease the seller’s profits. This yields the desired contradiction.  
 
Step 3. In Step 2 we showed that an optimal Ω is such that  2
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where the first equality follows by (a), and the second equality follows from (b) and (c) by the change of 
variables. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  We first show that the pricing strategy in (9) and consumers’ beliefs in (6), 
constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, that is, satisfy conditions (i) and (ii). Let  
 
) , ( 1 0


















] 0 |, | max[
2
1 0− − =
σ ] , min[ 1 0 2
1 c c t q σ − − +  
denote the ex post equilibrium profits, where the second equality is obtained by substitution of (A14) 
evaluated at (9) into (2). Now we can rewrite condition (i) as follows:  30 
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The first equality follows from (A14) , and the second equality follows by (9). To obtain the last 
equality, note that for  σ
t c c < − | | 0 1  an optimal solution is such that  | | 0 1 c c c c − = − , and for 
σ
t c c ≥ − | | 0 1  an optimal solution is such that  σ
t c c ≥ − | | .    
Next we verify that the seller never wants to deviate from (9) when  σ + ≥ t q 2
1 .  
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where µ  and λ  are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints in (A19) and (A20). Summing together 
(A20) and (A21) implies that (A22) must hold as a strict inequality, that is, at optimum  2
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There are five cases that need to be considered. 
Case (a). Suppose that  ∆ − ≤1 σ . In this case, as we will verify next, constraints (A24) and (A25) do not 
bind, and the seller offers all three products at prices  4
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Upon simplification these inequalities become  0 1 2
2 ≤ − − σ σ , which holds for all  ∆ − ≤1 σ .  
Case (b). Suppose that  ∆ − ≤ < ∆ − 2
1 1 1 σ . In this case, again, at optimum constraints (A24) and (A25) 
do not bind, and the seller offers labeled variety 0 and an unlabeled variety at prices  4
3
0
σ + ∆ + = p  and 
2
1 = n p . Substituting  4
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But it is easy to verify that (A26) and (A27) are implied by  ∆ − ≤ < ∆ − 2
1 1 1 σ . 
Case (c). Suppose that  ∆ + ≤ < ∆ − 2
1
2
1 1 1 σ . In this case the equilibrium pricing strategy is the same as in 
case (b). Constraint (A24) is unchanged, and condition (A26) is implied by  ∆ + ≤ < ∆ − 2
1
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which, upon simplification, becomes  ∆ − ≤ 2 5 σ , and is also implied by  ∆ + ≤ 2
1 1 σ . 
Case (d). Suppose that  ∆ + ≤ < ∆ + 1 1 2
1 σ . For  ) 1 2 ( 2 − < ∆ the equilibrium pricing strategy is the 
same as in cases (b) and (c), and constraints (A24) and (A25) do not bind. Substituting  4
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1 1 ), and it is 
positive at  ∆ + = 2
1 1 σ . Constraint (A25) is the same as in case (c), and therefore holds because 
∆ − ≤ 2 5 σ  is implied by  ∆ + ≤1 σ  for  ) 1 2 ( 2 − < ∆ . 
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The larger root is  4
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Case (e). Suppose that  ∆ + >1 σ . For  ) 1 2 ( 2 − < ∆ constraints (A24) and (A25) do not bind, and all 
consumers buy an unlabeled variety at  2
1 = n p  ( 2 0 1 ∆ + = p ,  2 1 1 ∆ − = p ). Substituting  2 0 1 ∆ + = p , 
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As in case (d), for  ) 1 2 ( 2 − ≥ ∆  constraint (A25) binds and  0 p  satisfies equation (A28), that is, 
4
) 2 5 ( 3
0
∆ − + ∆ + = p  (with  2 1 1 ∆ − = p  and  2
1 = n p ), and constraint (A24) is satisfied provided that condition 
(A29) holds.  
If condition (A29) does not hold, then in the best equilibrium the seller offers only labeled variety 
0 at  ) 1 ( 2 2
1
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1
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This is because there are no “non-revealing” prices  2 0 1 ∆ + ≤ p ,  2 1 1 ∆ − ≤ p ,  2
1 ≤ n p  such that constraints 
(A24) and (A25) are simultaneously satisfied. ■ 
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